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Abstract
& Neurophysiological and behavioral studies have shown
that perception and memory share neural substrates and
functional properties. But are perception and the active
working memory of a stimulus one and the same? To address
this question in the spatial domain, we compared the percept
and the working memory of the position of a target stimulus
embedded within a surround of moving dots. Motion in a
particular direction after the target’s offset biased the
memory of target location in the same direction. However,
motion simultaneous with a high-contrast, perceptually
strong target biased the percept of target location in the
opposite direction. Thus, perception and working memory
can be modified by motion in qualitatively different ways.
Manipulations to strengthen the memory trace had no effect
on the direction of the memory bias, indicating that memory
signal strength can never equal that of the percept of a
strong stimulus. However, the percept of a weak stimulus
was biased in the direction of motion. Thus, although
perception and working memory are not inherently different,
they can differ behaviorally depending on the strength of the
perceptual signal. Understanding how a changing surround
biases neural representations in general, and postsensory
processes in particular, can help one understand past reports
of spatial mislocalization. &
Operationally, perception can be regarded as a repre-
sentation in the brain of something currently or very
recently present on the retina, and memory (disregard-
ing otherwise important distinctions between different
kinds of memories) as an internal representation of
something that was shown in the past. Past studies
have demonstrated vigorous interactions between per-
ception and memory (Kerst & Howard, 1978; Kosslyn,
Ball, & Resier, 1978) and have shown that perception
and memory share several common functional proper-
ties (Ishai & Sagi, 1995a, 1995b) and apparently com-
mon representations in the brain (Kosslyn et al., 1999;
Belger et al., 1998; Smith et al., 1995; Petrides, Alivas-
tos, Evans, & Meyer, 1993; Bisaich & Luzzatti, 1978).
Nonetheless, intuition suggests that some differences
must exist between the mental processes that underlie
perception and the mental processes or mechanisms
that construct and keep active an internal representa-
tion of something consciously perceived earlier—
processes that define working memory. In the present
study on spatial working memory, an active form of
visual short-term memory, we show just that. In partic-
ular, we demonstrate that the effects of visual context
(surround motion) on spatial perception and spatial
working memory can be similar or opposite, depending
on the strength of the stimulus. We show that the
bottom-up, sensory signal of a physically present stim-
ulus is powerful and robust, while the signal generated
from postsensory internal mechanisms underlying
working memory is not. A clear demarcation of sensory
and postsensory mechanisms can better our under-
standing of perceptual effects, which we demonstrate
with an example.
RESULTS
In Experiment Ia, a stationary, circular, high-stimulus
energy target was displayed on a surround comprised
of randomly located dots (see Methods). All the dots
drifted horizontally—left or right depending on the
trial—with constant, uniform velocity (Figure 1A, i).
The target remained on the screen during the entire
time the surround dots drifted (Figure 1A, ii). The
observer’s task was to judge the horizontal position
(left or right?) of the target relative to that of a high-
contrast reference marker located just above the mov-
ing surround and close to the fixation point (FP), and
displayed during the last 90 msec that the target was on
(Figure 1A, ii). It bears mention that the marker was
briefly displayed while the target was still present, so
judging the target’s position relative to the marker was
a perceptual task. The combined response over all
observers (n = 4; one author and three naı¨ve observ-
ers) is shown in Figure 1B for both the surround dots
drifting right (black squares, black curve) and the sur-
round dots drifting left conditions (open circles, gray
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curve). The data were fitted with psychometric curves
using probit analysis (McKee, Klein, & Teller, 1985;
Finney, 1971). The magnitude of the bias is half the
distance between the points of subjective equality (PSEs)
defined under the two curves in Figure 1B (double
arrow; 24 minutes of arc, or arcmin, negative values
signify that the direction of the bias was opposite to that
of the surround’s motion). For each observer, the target
was mislocalized in the direction opposite that of the
motion of the surround (we call this effect ‘‘induced
position,’’ analogous with the perceptual phenomenon
of induced motion; Duncker, 1938). The bootstrap
method (Foster & Bischof, 1991) revealed the difference
in threshold estimates (T50) between the two psycho-
metric functions was highly significant ( p < .001; see
Methods: Statistical analysis, for details).
Because the surround dots remained on the screen
after the target’s disappearance, one might argue that
the internal representation of the target was dragged
by a motion after effect (MAE) that followed the true
motion but in the opposite direction, thereby account-
ing for the mislocalization. This is unlikely however, as
2.9 sec of motion is too short to generate a robust MAE
(Wohlgemuth, 1911). Our own experiments with the
MAE show that 30-sec- to 1-min-long motion is required
to get a mislocalization of comparable magnitude
(Sheth & Shimojo, 2000b). Finally, in a control experi-
ment, we blanked the entire screen once the dots
stopped moving. Because neither the dots nor the
marker remained on after the target’s offset, no MAE
was possible. In spite of this, target position estimates
were shifted in the opposite direction to the motion
Figure 1. Effects of concurrent
and subsequent motion of
the surround on the position
judgment of a perceptually
strong, stationary target. (A)
Display (i) and timeline (ii) of a
trial in Experiment Ia (percep-
tually strong target, concurrent
motion). (B) Group responses
(n = 4) over each of seven
predetermined locations of the
target relative to a marker are
shown. The intersections of the
vertical dotted lines with the
two curves are the points of
subjective equality (PSE), where
the target appears to the left or
right of the marker an equal
number of times. Surround
motion on the left (right)
biased estimates rightward
(leftward). (C) Display (i) and
timeline (ii) of a trial in Experi-
ment Ib (perceptually strong
target, subsequent motion).
(D) Group data (n = 4) from
Experiment Ib are given.
Surround motion on the left
(right) biased estimates left-
ward (rightward). Note that the
relative locations of left and
right surround motion PSEs are
reversed compared with those
in (B).
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(n = 2; mean bias = 18 arcmin).1 On the basis of
these experiments and arguments, we conclude that the
mislocalization was not caused by a MAE that might
have followed the true motion.
In Experiment Ia, the task was to render a perceptual
judgment of the target position. What if the task is to
render a judgment based on working memory of the
target position instead? Figure 1C and D, respectively,
give the timeline and results of Experiment Ib. As
before, the perceptually strong target was shown for
the same 2.9-sec duration but the surround dots re-
mained stationary (Figure 1C, i). The dots moved only
after target offset, and the marker appeared in the last
90 msec of the 2.9-sec-long surround motion period.
Thus, unlike in Experiment Ia, the marker came on
more than 2.8 sec after the target was turned off. So
judgment of the target’s position relative to the marker
could not be based on bottom-up sensory signals
(Figure 1C, ii) or on iconic memory, which has a life
span of less than 1 sec beyond sensory stimulation
(Sperling, 1960). Instead, the judgment had to be based
on an internal working memory representation of the
target’s spatial location. Figure 1D shows that these
remembered target position estimates were displaced
significantly in the direction of the subsequent sur-
round motion (analogous with the perceptual phenom-
enon of motion capture, we term this ‘‘position
capture’’; see also Corballis & Corballis, 1993). The bias
(+33 arcmin) was in the opposite direction of the bias
in Experiment Ia, which is depicted by the left–right
reversals of the PSEs of the left and right surround
motion functions in Figure 1D versus Figure 1B. The
bootstrap method (Foster & Bischof, 1991) revealed
that the difference in threshold estimates between the
two psychometric functions in Figure 1D was significant
( p < .001). In demonstrating that surrounding motion
shifted perception and memory of target position in
opposite directions, Experiment I provides evidence for
a dissociation of perception and working memory
(Sheth & Shimojo, 2000a).
Because the reference marker was transiently dis-
played, one might argue that the flashed marker, not
the target, was displaced by the adjacent moving field
(Whitney & Cavanagh, 2000). However, there are several
reasons why this is highly unlikely. First, the marker was
closer to the FP than was the motion field, which
reduces flash mislocalization to near zero. Moreover,
the surround did not move once the flashed marker
was off; in later experiments (see Figures 4 and 5), we
will show that the perception of a flashed stimulus is
not displaced by motion concurrent with the stimulus
but by motion after the target’s disappearance. Also, in
a control experiment, instead of comparing the target’s
position relative to some marker, observers had to use
a computer mouse to indicate their estimate of target
position. On the concurrent motion task modeled after
Experiment Ia, estimates of all three observers (mean
bias ± SEM = 51 ± 12 arcmin) were biased in the
direction opposite the motion, thus duplicating the
result of Experiment Ia. On the subsequent motion
task modeled after Experiment Ib, estimates (n = 4;
bias = +26 ± 16 arcmin) were biased in the direction
of the motion, duplicating the result of Experiment Ib.
Similar findings in the no-marker motor task as in
Experiment I suggest that the target, not the marker,
was mislocalized in Experiment I. In an additional
control experiment, we explicitly tested whether the
marker was mislocalized. Observers (n = 2) had to
judge the position of the marker relative to that of a
foveal bar located more than 38 from the motion field
(mislocalization by a remote motion field is near zero
for separations >38, Whitney & Cavanagh, 2000). Sur-
round motion had no effect on marker localization
(mean bias <1 arcmin). From the above experiments,
we conclude that the target, not the marker, was
mislocalized in our experiments.
How can Experiment I, which shows that perception
and memory are dissociable under certain conditions, be
reconciled with the common belief that perception and
memory have many common characteristics (Ishai &
Sagi, 1995a, 1995b; Mehta, Newcombe, & DeHaan,
1992; Bisaich & Luzzatti, 1978; Kerst & Howard, 1978;
Kosslyn et al., 1978, 1999)? The question can be posed
more directly. Can perception and memory be displaced
in the same direction under a different set of conditions?
In a past study in which subjects had to judge the
direction of motion of a target motion embedded in a
moving surround, perceived induced motion switched to
motion capture when target signal strength was reduced
(Murakami & Shimojo, 1993). We hypothesized that in
replacing the high-contrast target of Experiment I with a
low-contrast one in the next pair of experiments (Experi-
ment II), the resulting reduction in stimulus strength
should reverse the direction of perceptual bias. Other
than the change in target contrast, Experiments Ia and IIa
(Figure 2A and B) were identical, as were Experiments Ib
and IIb (Figure 2C and D). As anticipated, perceptual
estimates of the perceptually weak target in Experiment
II were pulled in the direction of motion (Figure 2B). Bias
magnitude was +17 arcmin, and was marginally signifi-
cant ( p < .1). In Experiment IIb, motion after the
presentation of the weak target (Figure 2C) also biased
judgments in the direction of motion (Figure 2D), and
the mean bias magnitude (+30 arcmin) was highly
significant ( p < .001).
To sum up, motion in a given direction displaces the
perceived location of a perceptually strong stimulus in
the opposite direction. But, working memory of the
perceptually strong stimulus, the percept of a weak
stimulus, and working memory of the weak stimulus
are all shifted in the direction of motion. It seems,
therefore, that if the stimulus is of sufficiently high
contrast, the perceptual signal will be strong and
robust, whereas the strength of the working memory
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signal, regardless of the strength of the original per-
ceptual signal, has an upper limit. Consistent with this,
the memory error in the weak stimulus condition was
larger than the corresponding perceptual error (com-
pare Figure 2B and D), and the remembered positions
of the low- and high-contrast targets were shifted by
similar amounts in the direction of motion. That is to
say, positional signals obtained from memory are
invariably weak, and therefore susceptible to being
biased in the direction of motion regardless of how
strong is the original percept, or the memory trace.
There is a second possibility. If the memory trace is
strengthened substantially, the bias in the direction of
motion could be reduced considerably, or better yet,
remembered judgments of position could shift in the
opposite direction, as does the perception of a high-
contrast stimulus.
Manipulations that presumably enhanced the strength
of the memory trace indirectly (by enhancing the
strength of the perceptual stimulus) or directly failed
to reverse or reduce significantly the memory bias in the
direction of surround motion, supporting the first
hypothesis, namely, working memory is an invariably
weak signal. In one experiment, we repeatedly blinked
the stationary target on and off to reduce adaptation and
refresh its neural representation (and also dimmed the
surround dots to near-threshold levels in order to
enhance target salience). In a second experiment, we
fixed the actual location of the target on half the trials
(target location was randomized on the other half), the
rationale being that over many trials in which the target
at the same location, memory for that location should
enhance and become the equal of a perceptually strong
stimulus in signal strength. In both experiments though,
Figure 2. Effects of concurrent
and subsequent motion of the
surround on position judg-
ments of a perceptually weak,
stationary target. (A) Display
(i) and timeline (ii) of a trial in
Experiment IIa (perceptually
weak target, concurrent
motion). The gray hue of the
target signifies its lower overall
luminance and contrast
compared to Experiment 1.
(B) Group data of four
observers and the psychometric
curves generated by probit
analysis. Surround motion
on the left (right) biased
estimates leftward (rightward).
(C) Display (i) and timeline
(ii) of a trial in Experiment IIb
(perceptually weak target,
subsequent motion) were
identical to the trials in
Experiment IIa except for the
lower luminance and contrast
of the target in Experiment IIb.
(D) Group data and psycho-
metric curves from Experiment
IIb. Surround motion on the
left (right) biased estimates
leftward (rightward).
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estimates of remembered target position remained sig-
nificantly shifted in the direction of motion supporting
the first hypothesis.
To further generalize our findings, we investigated
whether motion influences imagery in the same way
that motion-influenced stimulus-derived memory (see
Experiments Ib and IIb). In the imagery experiment, the
observer must maintain in working memory the repre-
sentation of a target never shown explicitly while the
surround dots continue to drift. Given the difference in
visual stimulation in the imagery experiment, a similar
outcome to the one in the stimulus memory experi-
ments should confirm the generality of our hypothesis
about memory. A set of four salient, stationary ‘‘target’’
bars were arranged on a static random dots background
such that their imaginary extensions intersected at an
imaginary point (Experiment III; Figure 3A, i). We asked
participants (n = 3) to imagine an asterisk (to minimize
contamination, the object to be imagined and the
reference marker—a vertical bar—were kept different)
centered on the imaginary intersection point. The rest
of the experiment followed along the lines of previous
memory experiments. The target bars disappeared, then
the surround dots drifted, and finally the reference
Figure 3. Effects of surround
motion on the stored position of
an imagined target. (A) Display
(i) and timeline (ii) of a trial in
Experiment III (imagery).
(B) Group data (n = 3) for
both motion directions are
given. For comparison, group
data from the same three
observers in Experiment Ib—
the nonimagery counterpart—
are given in the inset.
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marker came on in the tail end of the motion (Figure
3A, ii). The observer’s task was the same as before: To
judge the remembered position of the imagined target
relative to the visual marker. Position estimates of the
imagined target were found to be biased in the
direction of motion (Figure 3B, mean bias = +34
arcmin, p < .001). For comparison, pooled data from
the same three participants on the stimulus memory
task (Experiment Ib) are shown in Figure 3B, inset
(mean bias = +37 arcmin in Experiment Ib). Both
direction and magnitude of the mislocalization in the
imagery and stimulus memory experiments were sim-
ilar, qualitatively and quantitatively. The parallels in
data indicate that imagery, like explicit stimulus memory,
is weak, in agreement with our own assertion that
memory can never equal a perceptual stimulus of high
strength.
The remarkable agreement in bias direction in all of
our memory experiment data signifies that under diverse
experimental manipulations, memory continues to be
biased in the direction of motion, indicative of a repre-
sentation of low signal strength. Thus, our work provides
evidence for the idea that a weak percept has a behav-
ioral analog in working memory (Experiment II), but a
strong percept does not (Experiment I).
We assert that signal-strength-based dissociation
between perception and active memory, or more gen-
erally, between sensory and postsensory processes
Figure 4. Effects of
surround motion on the
position judgment of a briefly
displayed but otherwise salient
(high-luminance, high-contrast)
target. (A) Display (i) and
timeline (ii) of a trial in
Experiment IV (transient target
experiment). The observer
could respond only after the
dots stopped moving. (B)
Group data (n = 5) are shown.
The target was mislocalized in
the direction of motion.
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(includes iconic memory, a component of perceptual
processes) can reshape our understanding of the mech-
anisms underlying well-known spatial localization phe-
nomena ( Whitney & Cavanagh, 2000; Nishida &
Johnston, 1999; Snowden, 1998; Freyd & Finke, 1984).
To illustrate our point, we will analyze the phenomen-
on of motion capture and the accompanying mislo-
calization of target position (Whitney & Cavanagh,
2000; de Valois & de Valois, 1991; Ramachandran &
Anstis, 1990). Motion capture occurs when a briefly
flashed stationary target embedded within a moving
surround is perceived to shift in the direction of motion.
Experiment IV investigates whether motion capture sys-
tematically displaces estimates of target location in our
paradigm. Compared with Experiment Ia, two stimulus
parameters were changed. One, target duration was
shortened to 150 msec, and two, reference marker and
target were presented synchronously (Figure 4A). In
accord with previous studies, but not with Experi-
ment Ia of the present study, observers’ (n = 5)
estimates of perceived target position were significantly
shifted in the direction of the surround motion (Figure
4B, mean bias = +20 arcmin, p < .005). The direction of
mislocalization was opposite that observed in the high-
contrast target perceptual task (Experiment Ia). In
Experiment Ia, surround motion ceased the moment
the target was turned off, whereas in Experment IV, the
surround continued drifting. Could this difference in
timing account for the difference in the outcomes of the
two experiments? In other words, could motion follow-
ing the target presentation account entirely for the
mislocalization in the motion capture paradigm?
Figure 5. Varying the timing of
surround motion relative to
target presentation and its
effect on position judgment.
(A) Display (i) and timeline (ii)
of a trial in Experiment Va
(synchronous motion and
target presentation). (B) Group
data (n = 3) are shown. For the
sake of comparison, data from
Experiment IV for the same
three observers are given in the
accompanying inset. (C) Dis-
play (i) and timeline (ii) of a
trial in Experiment Vb (target
displayed at tail end of motion).
(D) Group data (n = 4) are
shown. For comparison, the
inset gives Experiment IV data
from the same four observers.
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We addressed this question by stopping all motion
after the target’s offset and seeing whether mislocaliza-
tion was eliminated. In Experiment Va, target and refer-
ence marker appeared at the start and remained on for
150 msec. Unlike Experiment IV, however, the surround
dots stopped moving upon target offset (Figure 5A). The
design thus isolated the effect of motion to when the
target was physically present. In this case, the motion
shifted target position estimates negligibly (Figure 5B,
mean bias = +3 arcmin, p > .55, n = 3). Figure 5B,
inset, shows data from the same three observers in
Experiment IV for comparison. In a second experiment
we allowed the surround to move for the 2.9-sec period
as in Experiment IV, but presented the target (and the
marker) in the last 150 msec of it (Experiment Vb). All
other parameters assumed Experiment IV values (Figure
5C). Again, motion did not bias observers’ (n = 4) target
position estimates at all (Figure 5D, mean bias =
3 arcmin, p > .6). Thus, based on Experiments IV
and V, motion of the surround did not distort the
perceived target position while the target was present
on the screen. Rather, motion after the target was offset
displaced a postsensory iconic memory representation
of the target, a representation that is presumably incor-
porated into the percept. We believe that the same
general rule applies in other phenomena (Nishida &
Johnston, 1999; Snowden, 1998; Freyd & Finke, 1984).
A changing context can modify a signal of weak strength,
and short-term working memory and postsensory pro-
cesses (i.e., iconic memory) are signals of weak strength.
DISCUSSION
The present study shows that perception and working
memory can be similar or dissimilar depending on the
strength of the perceptual stimulus. For low stimulus
strengths, perception and working memory are biased in
the same direction by motion of the surround. For high
stimulus strengths, memory is biased as before, but
perception is either biased in the opposite direction or
not biased at all. Experiments using blinking targets on
backgrounds with barely visible dots, or a target pre-
sented at a fixed location throughout the session, or
target imagery all yielded data indicating the memory
signal simply cannot be robust enough to ever be
the equal of a perceptual signal of high strength. On
the other hand, a perceptually weak stimulus can be the
equivalent of working memory in terms of what effect
motion has on it. Thus, perception and working memory
are not intrinsically different, as others have argued
(Ishai & Sagi, 1995a, 1995b; Bisaich & Luzzatti, 1978;
Kerst & Howard, 1978; Kosslyn et al., 1978, 1999), but
they do, under certain conditions, differ behaviorally
because of differential signal strengths.
A slightly different account of our data considers
perception and working memory to be two separate
but interconnected systems. If the target has high con-
trast, the perceptual system dominates, so when the
surround moves, the representation is displaced against
the direction of motion. If the target has low contrast or
if it is absent, the representation in working memory
dominates and the representation is displaced in the
direction of motion. This account differs from the
previous one in the supposition that working memory,
and not the perceptual system, is used even when the
stimulus is visible and being perceived, for example, in
the low-contrast stimulus condition.
Single-unit recordings in macaque PFC and PC (Cha-
fee & Goldman-Rakic, 1998; Mazzoni, Bracewell, Barash,
& Andersen, 1996; Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic,
1989) have shown that ‘‘memory’’ neurons in the PFC
often have significant ‘‘perceptual’’ activity (fire when
the stimulus is on), suggesting a continuum between
perception and memory in the physiology. Conversely,
exclusively ‘‘perceptual’’ neurons have also been found
within the same recording area in which memory neu-
rons were found, which seems more compatible with
the alternative notion that memory and perception are
two separate but interconnected systems.
In spite of their subtle differences, both accounts
recognize signal strength as the key parameter and both
imply two modes of processing—one for strong signals
and another for weak signals, including memory. In-
deed, it is conceivable that the brain uses different
strategies to process stimuli of different strengths. If
the stimulus is perceptually salient and unambiguous,
the neural activity possibly has a sharp peak in the
location of the stimulus in the brain map, which would
determine the judged location. On the other hand, if
the stimulus is ambiguous and weak, a winner-take-all
mode may not suffice. In order to boost the signal, the
brain may need to pool activity over the map over
several processing cycles, and then take the center of
the pooled activity as the location of the stimulus. As a
result, neighboring locations activated in the direction
of motion will distort the judged activity center in the
motion direction. Switching modes to an averaging
strategy and maintaining activity over time for pooling
both may require feedback from higher areas, and could
potentially explain the involvement of higher areas
(prefrontal cortex [PFC] and parietal cortex [PC]) in
spatial memory tasks in humans (Belger et al., 1998;
Smith et al., 1995; Petrides et al., 1993).
That activity in the delay period between stimulus
offset and response is elevated above spontaneous levels
in ‘‘memory neurons’’ (Chafee & Goldman-Rakic, 1998;
Mazzoni et al., 1996; Funahashi et al., 1989) demon-
strates that memory is stored as active neuronal activity.
By showing that memory of target location is altered by
surround motion, we lend psychophysical support to the
prevailing notion that memory is an active reconstruc-
tion. Furthermore, our work on how ongoing motion
alters remembered position implies that active, working
memory, once created, does not simply fade over time in
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an autonomous or undirected fashion, but interacts
vigorously with ongoing perceptual signals (Sheth &
Shimojo, 2001). Being labile (Nader, Schafe, & Le Doux,
2000), active memory distorted by the perceptual signals
as a consequence. Thus, active memory bears the im-
print not only of the perceptual input that created it but
also of all perceptual events from its inception to its
eventual retrieval (Sheth & Shimojo, 2000a).
Our study differs markedly from other reports on
the effects of motion on judgments of target position
( Whitney & Cavanagh, 2000; Nishida & Johnston, 1999;
Snowden, 1998). These studies showed how motion
influences the ‘‘perceived’’ position of a stationary object
that is either coincident (Nishida & Johnston, 1999;
Snowden, 1998) or noncoincident ( Whitney & Cava-
nagh, 2000) ‘‘in space’’ with the motion. In contrast,
our study shows how motion influences the ‘‘perceived’’
and actively ‘‘remembered’’ positions of a stationary
object that are, respectively, coincident and noncoinci-
dent ‘‘in time’’ with the motion. Nonetheless, our work,
which suggests memory (postsensory processes, more
generally)—no matter how salient—never rises to the
level of a perceptual stimulus of high signal strength, and
which shows that changing context affects high- and low-
strength signals differently provides a common frame-
work for all such studies ( Whitney & Cavanagh, 2000;
Nishida & Johnston, 1999; Snowden, 1998; Freyd &
Finke, 1984). A case in point, it was earlier believed that
the MAE is not accompanied by a shift in the perceived
position of the pattern being viewed (Nakayama, 1985;
Gregory, 1966). However, there are recent reports of an
illusory shift in position in the direction of the perceived
MAE (Nishida & Johnston, 1999; Snowden, 1998). In the
Nishida and Johnston (1999) study, a windmill pattern,
whose segments differ minimally in contrast from their
immediate neighbors, was used, and in the Snowden
(1998) study, postsensory processes were biased. There-
fore, in both studies, the signals that were displaced in
space by the motion were weak—congruent with the
themes of the present study.
Akin to our work on spatial memory, studies of high-
level cognitive visual memory have found that postevent
information becomes inextricably integrated into the
original memory and irreversibly distorts it (Loftus &
Palmer, 1974). In conjunction with those studies, our
study showing distortions in low-level, visual spatial
memory (see also Sheth & Shimojo, 2001) implies a
surprising universality to memory dynamics. Studies of
high-level visual memory have been criticized on the
grounds that high-level distortions occur only in the
retrieval process, not in the memory itself. That is to say,
cognitive factors related to selection (response) can
explain the distortions (Palmer, 1999; Riley, 1962). The
low-level, precognitive nature of the spatial memory in
the present study precludes this confound.
In conclusion, the strength of the perceptual stimulus
determines the relationship between perception and
working memory. Experiments under a variety of con-
ditions suggest that memory is at best, only a faint echo
of the actual percept and never the equivalent of a vivid,
strong percept. Realizing how changing contexts bias
memory and postsensory processes may go a long way in
understanding many a ‘‘perceptual’’ phenomena too.
METHODS
Common Stimulus and Task Parameters
All stimuli were presented on a Sony Trinitron monitor
(size: 37.5  30 cm, 75 Hz refresh) under control of a
MAC PowerPC running MATLAB (Mathworks) and Psy-
chophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). View-
ing was binocular. Room lights were turned off, and the
observer had to maintain gaze on the FP throughout the
trial. The observer’s head was partially immobilized by
means of a chin- and headrest placed 28.5 cm (1 cm =
28 of visual angle) from the computer monitor. The
target subtended a diameter of 0.658 of visual angle.
The surround consisted of a full field of 10,000 ran-
domly placed dots, and occupied the entire screen.
The mean dot density across the monitor was approx-
imately 2.3 dots/degree2. The dots were both smaller in
size (11 arcmin diameter each) and of lower luminance
(0.39 cd/m2 each) than the target. Only dots within
a central 408  408 area moved (100% coherence,
6.08/sec speed) whereas the dots outside this area
remained stationary. The direction (left/right) of hori-
zontal background motion was randomized on every
trial. The fixation point (FP) was always at the top of the
screen, 5 cm above the central area of moving dots.
Across trials, the horizontal coordinate of the target was
randomly chosen from a predetermined range ([108,
108]) on either side of the FP, and the vertical coordinate
was in a range [268, 348] below the FP. The unusually
short viewing distance and large target eccentricities
served several purposes. One, the observer had to pay
attention to perceive the target (lack of attention attenu-
ates the effect). Two, in the case of a low contrast or
briefly presented target, its large eccentricity rendered it
much less salient than it could have otherwise been in
the fovea. Three, the eccentricities were too large for the
observer to even inadvertently saccade to the target from
the original FP. After stimulus offset and upon hearing a
beep, the observer had to respond by pressing one of
two adjacent keys on a computer keyboard as to whether
the target was left or right of the reference marker
(18 long  0.058 wide) presented just above the moving
field. In separate but randomly interleaved trials, each
stimulus sequence was run with all the surround dots
drifting either left or right. This compensates for any
selection bias on the observer’s part. The horizontal
coordinate of the reference marker relative to the target
was chosen from one of seven prespecified, equally
spaced values—one marker horizontal coordinate the
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exact same as the target, and three each left and right
of the target of linearly increasing physical distance
from it. On a given task, each observer (chosen from
a pool of nine volunteers: one author, the rest naive)
ran 20 trials/motion direction (2)/point (7), for a total
of 280 (20  2  7) trials. Each experimental session
typically lasted 50–55 min, not including breaks.
Experiment Ia (Perceptually Strong Target,
Concurrent Motion)
The stationary target (2.9-sec duration, nearly 100%
contrast, 53.3 cd/m2 luminance) was embedded on a
dark screen (<0.01 cd/m2 luminance with no dots
turned on) containing randomly placed dots, each of
luminance 0.39 cd/m2. The central area of dots (indi-
cated by the dashed border shown here for illustrative
purposes only) drifted during the entire time the target
remained on, while the dots outside the central area
remained stationary. Ninety milliseconds before the
target was to disappear and the dots were to stop
moving, a bright, short vertical bar (marker) was ran-
domly shown above the moving surround on the screen
with equal probability from a set of seven predeter-
mined horizontal coordinates. Upon disappearance of
target and marker and simultaneous cessation of dot
motion, the observer reported, in a self-paced manner,
whether the target appeared left or right of the marker
in a forced-choice paradigm.
Experiment Ib (Perceptually Strong Target,
Subsequent Motion)
The stationary target (4.8 cd/m2 and 84% luminance
contrast) stayed on for 2.9 sec on a background of
randomly placed static dots (background luminance
minus the dots was 0.4 cd/m2). Once the target was
extinguished, the dots began drifting. Ninety millisec-
onds before the end of the motion, the marker
appeared. Once the motion stopped and the marker
was turned off the same instant, the observer could
respond at any time.
Experiment IIa (Perceptually Weak Target,
Concurrent Motion)
Parameters and experimental procedures were identical
to that in Experiment Ia with the sole difference being
the lower luminance (4.8 cd/m2) and contrast (84%) of
the target.
Experiment IIb (Perceptually Weak Target,
Subsequent Motion)
Parameters and experimental procedures were identi-
cal to that in Experiment Ib with the sole difference
being the lower luminance (4.8 cd/m2) and contrast
(84%) of the target.
Experiment III (Imagery)
Four bright (53.3 cd/m2 luminance) stationary bars
(dimensions: 28  0.038) were displayed for a duration
of 2.9 sec on a static random-dots surround (back-
ground luminance <0.01 cd/m2). The observer had to
imagine a target shaped as an asterisk centered on the
extrapolated intersection point of the bars. As in
Experiments Ib and IIb, once the target was turned
off, the dots in the central dashed area began moving
coherently left or right for 2.9 sec. A marker was shown
for 90 msec before the motion was to stop (task was
the same as in prior experiments).
Experiment IV (Transient Target)
The target (53.3 cd/m2 luminance, nearly 100% contrast)
and marker were displayed during the first 150 msec of
the 2.9-sec-long surround motion. After the dots stop-
ped moving, the observer could indicate his/her judg-
ment of the target’s horizontal location relative to that of
the marker.
Experiment Va (Synchronous Motion and Target)
Target parameters were identical to Experiment IV. The
surround (dots lying within the dashed borders) drifted
randomly left or right for 150 msec only. During this
entire time the target and marker were displayed. As
before, the observer could respond after the dots stop-
ped moving.
Experiment Vb (Target Displayed at Tail End
of Motion)
The surround drifted randomly left or right for 2.9 sec,
just as in Experiment IV. The target and marker
appeared for the last 150 msec of the motion. The
target and marker disappeared, and the dots stopped
moving—all in the same instant. The observer could
respond thereafter.
Statistical Analysis
Computer simulations using a bootstrap method (Fos-
ter & Bischof, 1991) to test the significance of the
difference in the two thresholds (left and right motion)
enumerated all possible pairs of psychometric functions
from the pooled distribution (right and left surround
motions averaged) and weighted them by their bino-
mial probability. Each of the possible pairs of psycho-
metric functions yielded a pair of threshold estimates.
The distribution of the threshold differences between
the pairs of psychometric functions generated using the
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bootstrap method was compared with the difference in
threshold between the two psychometric functions
[T(right)50  T(left)50] in each experiment. The upper
and lower threshold difference values of the distribution
that would exclude the upper and lower 0.5% of the
bootstrapped population, respectively, were taken as the
99% confidence limits. Using this technique, we can find
out whether or not the threshold difference between the
two psychometric functions in a given experiment fall
outside of the confidence limits ( p < .01).
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Note
1. Experiment Vb furnishes additional evidence against the
MAE account. In Experiment Vb (see Figure 5C), motion
duration was the same as in Experiment Ia. Hence, MAE
magnitude should be the same. Yet, there was no bias in the
direction of the MAE in Experiment Vb (see Figure 5D),
implying that the bias observed in Experiment Ia was not the
result of an MAE.
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